It is a general rule, that by remaining in the service of his master after having learned of the risks of his employment, a servant assumes such risks, and cannot recover for injuries. *Chic. & E. I. R. Co. v. Geary,* 110 Ill. 383. Also when an emlpoyee, after having the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the risks of his situation, accepts them, he cannot complain if subsequently injured by such exposure. *Masterson v. Eldridge,* 208 Pa. 242. However, the employee takes the risk of knowing of obvious dangers, and not of others. *Scanlon v. B. & A. R. Co.,* 147 Mass. 484. The servant, although he may know that the instrumentalities of the business are not in good repair and condition, does not thereby assume all risks provided the defects be not plainly dangerous. *Graham v. Newbery Orrel Coal & Coke Co.,* 38 W. Va. 273. In some states the defendant railroad comapny is estoppel to set up "assumption of risk" by statute. *Walker v. Carolina Cent. R. Co.,* 135 N. C. 738.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—DEFECTIVE STREETS—INJURIES TO PEDESTRIAN—NEGLIGENCE.—WINCKLER V. CITY OF NEW YORK, 113 N. Y. SUPP. 412.—In an action against a city for injuries to a pedestrian slipping on ice and snow on a sidewalk, evidence *held,* not to show actionable negligence of the city. Patterson and McLaughlin, J. J., *dissenting.*

That a municipal corporation is liable for damages arising from neglect in keeping streets in good condition, is established by many authorities. *Dean v. New Milford Township,* 5 W. & S. (Pa.) 545; *Pittsburg v. Grier,* 10 Harris 54. But ordinary care is all that is required on the part of city. *City of Quincy v. Barber,* 81 Ill. 300; *Town of Grayville v. Whitaker,* 85 Ill. App. 602. Sidewalks need only be reasonably safe. *City of Chicago v. McGivern,* 78 Ill. 347. The city is not liable for mere general slipperiness. *Maunch Chunk v. Kline,* 100 Pa. 122; *Cloughessy v. City,* 51 Conn. 405. The liability is not affected by the fact that city ordinance requires owners of property to clean walk in front of their premises. *Staton v. City of Springfield,* 12 Gray 571 (Mass.); *Wallace v. Mayor,* 18 How. 169.

NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE—STORING EXPLOSIVES.—FANNING V. J. G. WHITE & CO., 62 S. E. 734 (N. C.).—Where dynamite is stored in a shanty, on which there is no warning, near a railroad and a path where people walk at times, *held,* that the storing of dynamite was not a nuisance and did not violate any duty to persons coming on the premises without a license. Clark, C. J. and Hoke, J., *dissenting.*

The question as to whether or not the storing of dynamite is a public nuisance depends upon the locality, the quantity, and the surrounding circumstances. *Lounsbury v. Foss,* 30 N. Y. Supp. 89; *Heeg v. Licht,* 80 N. Y. 579. It has been held that the storing of explosives so located as to endanger the household may constitute a nuisance. *Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., 22* S. C. 476. Also that the storing of explosives on premises situated near the branch of a navigable river, a railroad and a public road, is a public nuisance *per se. Huntington Land Dev. Co. v. Phoenix Powder Mfg. Co.,* 40 W. Va. 711. However, the mere keeping of a large quantity of gunpowder near dwelling houses does not constitute a nuisance unless it is negligently and improvidently kept. *People v. Lands,* 1 Johns 78.